Yogini Mohit Sahita v. ITO [ITA No. 5419/Mum/2018,
dt. 27-7-2020] : 2020 Taxub(DT) 2962 (Mum-Trib.)
Taxability of amount received arising out of a
sub-licensee's right being relinquished
Facts:
One Mrs. Saraswati was the licensee of a flat in which 3 of
his Sons and their family were occupants. Assessee was the widow of one of her
deceased sons and was not even an occupant of the flat subsequent to her
husband's demise. The said flat was sold by the licensed owner to a real estate
developer. Arising out of the occupancy right of the flat the Assessee was paid
Rs. 25 lakhs as a one time settlement to vacate the said flat by the developer
thru a registered consent deed. Assessing officer held that the sum of 25 lakhs
was capital gains which arose from the relinquishment of rights in the
property. On appeal Commissioner (Appeals) held it as taxable under income from
other sources as neither did the assessee have any right in the said flat nor
was there any relinquishment of rights thus was a residual income taxable under
other sources. It was the plea of the assessee that the amount was a simple
capital receipt and exempt from capital gains. On appeal -
Held by ITAT in favour of the assessee that the amount was
a simple capital receipt outside capital gains tax liability.
Since rights of easements like license were not considered
as intangible asset rights like tenancy rights there was no capital gains tax
which could be fastened.
Editorial Note: Cost
of adverse possession is absent in the IT act thus no tax can be fastened was
also canvassed by the assessee reading BC Srinivasa Setty's case.
Had there been some interest in the property then it may
have to be seen from the perspective of a family settlement but here in this
case the payment was by the 3rd party developer so could not be called family
settlement either. There was no interest in the property to create an
asset/right in an asset which is what was held by ITAT.
The decision makes a noted reading as to what a license is
vis a vis a lease explaining why a license is only a legal easement under
Easements Act, 1882.
"There is a marked
distinction between a lease and a licence. Section 105 of the Transfer of
Property Act defines a lease of immoveable property as a transfer of a right to
enjoy such property made for a certain time in consideration for a price paid
or promised. Under section 108 of the said Act, the lessee is entitled to be
put in possession of the property. A lease is therefore a transfer of an
interest in land. The interest, transferred is called the leasehold interest.
The lessor parts with his right to enjoy the property during the term of the
lease, and it follows from it that the lessee gets that right to the exclusion
of the lessor.
Whereas section 52 of the Indian
Easements Act defines a licence thus :--
'Where one person grants to
another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do or continue to
do in or upon the immoveable property of the grantor, something which would, in
the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an
easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a licence.'
Under the aforesaid section, if
a document gives only a right to use the property in a particular way or under
certain terms while it remains in possession and control of the owner thereof,
it will be a licence. The legal possession, therefore, continues to be with the
owner of the property, but the licensee is permitted to make use of the
premises for a particular purpose. But for the permission, his occupation would
be unlawful. It does not create in his favour any estate or interest n the
property. There is, therefore, clear distinction between the two concepts. The
dividing line is clear though sometimes it becomes very thin or even blurred.
At one time it was thought that the test of exclusive possession was infallible
and if a person was given exclusive possession of a premises, it would
conclusively establish that he was a lessee. But there was a change and the
recent trend of judicial opinion is reflected in Errington v. Errington
(1952) 1 All E.R. 149, wherein Lord Denning reviewing the case law on the
subject summarizes the result of his discussion thus at p. 155 :--
'The result of all these cases
is that, although a person who is let into exclusive possession is prima
facie, to be considered to be tenant, nevertheless he will not be held to
be so if the circumstances negative any intention to create a tenancy.'
The Court of Appeal again in Cobb
v. Lane (1952) 1 All E.R. 1199 considered the legal position and laid down
that the intention of the parties was the real test for ascertaining the
character of a document. At p. 1201, Somervell, L.J., stated :
'................ the solution
that would seem to have been found is, as one would expect, that it must depend
on the intention of the parties.'
Denning, L. J., said much to the
same effect at p. 1202:
'The question in all these cases
is one of intention: Did the circumstances and the conduct of the parties show
that all that was intended was that the occupier should have a personal
privilege with no interest in the land?'
The following propositions may,
therefore, be taken as well-established:
(1) To ascertain whether a
document creates a licence or lease, the substance of the document must be
preferred to the form;
(2) The real test is the
intention of the parties-whether they intended to create a lease or a licence;
(3) If the document creates an
interest in the property, it is a lease; but, if it only permits another to
make use of the property, of which the legal possession continues with the
owner, it is a licence; and
(4) If under the document a
party gets exclusive possession of the property, prima facie, he is considered
to be a tenant; but circumstances may be established which negative the
intention to create a lease.
In the case of Sardar
Pruthisingh v. Kanchanlal Purushottamdas Desai AIR 2001 Bom. 255, the
Hon'ble Bombay High Court has observed that :--
"19. The distinction
between leave and licence had been well summarised in Halsbury's Laws of England,
Fourth Edition, Volume 27 page 13. In determining whether an agreement creates
between the parties the relationship of landlord and tenant or merely that of
licensor and licensee the decisive consideration is the intention of the
parties."
In P.N. Amersey-HUF v. ITO
(2012) 20 taxmann.com 704 (Mum.), the Tribunal has summarized the legal
position as under :--
(A) A lease is therefore a
transfer of an interest in land. The interest transferred is called the
leasehold interest. The lessor parts with his right to enjoy the property
during the term of the lease, and it follows from it that the lessee gets that
right to the exclusion of the lessor.
(B) If a document gives only a
right to use the property in a particular way or under certain terms while it
remains in possession and control of the owner thereof, it will be a licence.
The legal possession, therefore,
continues to be with the owner of the property, but the licensee is permitted
to make use of the premises for a particular purpose. But for the permission,
his occupation would be unlawful. It does not create in his favour any estate
or interest in the property. If, however, exclusive possession to which a
person is entitled under an agreement with a landlord is coupled with an
interest in the property, the agreement would be construed not as a mere
licence but as a lease."